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PRIVATE AGRO -
ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT : Green Business 
Rising 
Market-based environmental 
initiatives may be an idea 
whose time has arrived. 
Senng it aside: A Virginia crop 
producer walks along a strip of 
ground taken out of corn production 
and given over to water stewardship 
near the Rappahannock River. 
photo counesy Clear Window 
BY DAVID E. ERVIN AND FRANK CASEY 
W:lt:!n ho usehold incomes increase, lhe demand for environmclHal se rvices ("green" products and scrvict!s such as organic foods, environmcnrally 
friendly packagi ng, environmentally fr iendly producrion and 
disrr ibu don processes) increases faster than tht:! dt:l1land for 
agricultural comm odi ties. As a resul t, cnviro nmcntalman-
agement plays a larger role in lhe food industry. The poliTi -
cal process responds [0 chese demands by st lli ng standards 
and developing public programs. Market parricip3IHs - buy-
ers and se llers - also respond. Co nsumers and investors now 
reward farms and ag ribus in esscs thar supply desired envi-
rollmelHal services along with food and fiber. These market 
parricipants are turn ing to "green" products and the firm s 
that produce rhem. 
Scholars and managers have devoted much elTon to eval· 
uaring public environmental programs such as the Conservation 
Reserve Program (eRP). but li ttle an:l lys is has been directed 
at private .:tgro-envirollmental 1l1;.lnagemenr. The potential 
CHO I CES Third Quarter 2001 
and limitations of private activ it ies merit more study, especial ly 
during an administrat ion that seems to favor vo lulllary and 
private industry actions. A lack of understanding of ca uses 
and conse<:J uences of these private efforts wi ll hinder sound deci-
sions abour rheir roles in solving co mplex environ mental 
problems. and fai led private efro rts may prompt stTonger 
regul :Hion. Building understanding of the differcnr types of 
private environmental init iatives is a first step to using them 
ro help achieve sociely's environmental object ives of meeting 
growing green markel demand . and avoiding unnecessa ry 
cost and regulation. 
The Search for Private Green 
Today's fa rmers face a bewildering array of federal. statf!'. 
and local environmental p rograms, as well as a market that is 
increasingly rewarding environmenral quali ty. As the COStS of 
participa ti ng in public programs grow, and as [he marker for 
green products expands. producers have new and increased 
in centives ro pursue private environmental qual ity manage-
ment initiatives. 
Econom ic research on business environ mcneal manage-
ment (BEM) in indusrries oU(side of agriculture has grown 
rapidly oflate. The li rerarure idemifies rhree rypes ofBEM: uni-
lateral inida(ives by individual firm s to comrol pollution or by 
industry groups ro self-regulate. bilateral or nego tiated agrce-
melHs between the govern ment and firm s includ ing a volun-
cary environmenral target and a timetable for reaching ir, and 
volunrary governmenr programs to 
Other dai ry farm s moved [Q new locations CO avoid the added 
rcgularory costs 
Satisfying the demands of "green" consumers and investors. 
Remi l prod ucrs and invesrmenc fund s that emp hasize envi -
ronmental performance are multiplying. fnvestmenrs in "socially 
responsible" invcsrmenr funds grew from $40 billion in 1984 
co $2.16 tr ill ion in 1999 (Sociallnvcscment Forum , 1999), 
and mainstream food retailers are beginning CO srock "natu -
ral " and "o rganic" foods. 
enco urage individual firm s (farms) 
[0 pract ice cerrai n types of envi-
ronmental prorection. 
Green Alphabet Soup: 
Preempting or m itigati ng future 
environmcntal rcgulation s. The 
incentive to avoid government regu-
lation may increase as public demand 
for an improved ellvironmcnc grows. 
However, the cons of building coali -
tions among diverse farming interesrs 
may restrict effective BEM init iatives 
in farming. 
An Acronym Guide 
The rhird approach, voluntary 
government programs, has been the 
mainstay for agriculture. However, 
when incentives end, enviro nmen-
ral effort usually wanes. The poten-
rial for long-term environmental 
pro tection thlls depends on con-
tinuing the public fu nding. Toeal 
expenditures on USDA voluntary 
BEM: Business Environmenta l 
Management 
CRP: Conservation Reserve Program 
WRP: Wetland Reserve Program 
EQIP: Environmenta l Qua lity Incentives 
Program Strategic "management" of com-
petirors. Addin g expend itures co 
improve environmcnraJ performance 
may increase a firm's profits relative ro 
WHIP:Wildli fe Habitat Incentives 
Program 
RSA: Resource Stewardship Agreement 
incentive programs for soil erosion 
co mrol, improved warer qua li (y, wi ldli fe habi(;lt , and other 
purposes have ranged from $3.2 billion to $3.7 billion per year 
in nominal tcrms since \992 (Zinn). 
The level offundi.ng has declined in real terms. Congress may 
bl? unable to appropriarc enough funds for incenrives to sarisfy 
the growth in th e public's demand for agro-environmcncal 
improvemcnrs. Program refo rms (hat foster unilateral in irimives 
o r negotiated agreement-s may increase the effectiveness of the 
remaining public fund s. 
In our judgment, unilarera.l and negotiated environmenral 
schemes in agriculture will increase in number because of unsar-
isfi ed public demands for environmental services, along with 
efforrs by farmets and agribusin esses to avoid more str ingent 
regulations. Fi ve different but related motivations for private 
in volvement in [he production of environmenral services are 
described here. 
Improving firm productivity. The creation of production 
and marketing systems to implement BEM can lead ro the dis-
covery of COS t reductions or opportu nities for new products. 
Firms may find COSt savings from using BEM information , 
management sysrcms, and production techniques. Boggess. 
Johns, and Meline ( 1998) found productivity gains for some 
dairy farms thac adjusred [Q higher nutrient pollution control 
standards for Lake Okeechobee. The regub.tians encouraged (hese 
dajry farm ers to adopt new production technologies thar simu.1-
raneousiy reduced water pollution and improved nct returns. 
those of irs comperirors if its actions 
cause the competitors' ex penditures to ri se eve n highe r in 
matching the performance. Also, early adopte rs may enjoy a 
straregi c COSt advantage by forcing comperitors [0 follow suit 
or ri sk public or market penalties. 
Redefinin g markers. Some firm s can redefine their mar-
kets to deliver more env ironment-based va lue to customers. 
For exampl e. so me ranchers have differentiated their wool 
or beef products to show rhat they are using "predator fr iendly" 
production managemcnr sys tems. 
Early evi dence, mostly from outside agriculrure, suggests 
chat rhe probability of actua lly undertaking BEM in creases 
with firm size and higher R&D capacity. Firms also have more 
incentive to adopt BEM schemes if they produce final goods, 
fa ce strong competici on, a re innovative in their producrio n 
practices, or if they are usi ng older production equipmenr and 
will incur lower COStS aFter replacing ir. 
Growing consumer demands fo r green foods shou ld per-
suade an increasing number of agriculrural firms to practice 
BEM. The growth in green mutual fund s suggests investors 
also in flue nces rhe behavior of firms. Capital markers penal -
ize firms for higher than expected levels of toxic emission and 
reward them for superior environmemal performance. Businesses 
respond to such investor pressure. These pressures wiU mose likely 
be passed on to food processing and retai l firms thar use con-
rraCts to reward fanners whose production systems protect rhe 
envlronm enr. 
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Firms with poor environmental records are more likely ro 
undertake BEM [han firms [hat do nor face such cond irions. 
There are fewer environmentaJ regulatory penalties in agricuJrure 
than other indust ries. However, rhe number of regularory 
programs affecting farming is growing, especially at state and 
local levels and for animal agricultu re operations. The trend 
wi ll likely conrinue. Agriculture's tradi tion of volu nrary gov-
ernmem program.s backed by public payments stems in part 
from the problems of identifying 
and deali ng with diffuse and numer-
ous nonpoint sources of pollution. 
Public programs designed ro help 
spread BEM in farm ing can assist in 
red ucing such persistent problems. 
Giving Private Initiatives a 
Public Boost 
Public desire [Q improve the en vi-
ronmenral performance of agricul-
ture has spawned several programs 
at {he federal , state, and loca l lev-
els. T he la rgest is rhe eRP and irs 
companion programs - the Buffer rnitiative, the Conservation 
Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP). and the Wedand 
Reserve Program (WRP). The smalle r Environmental Qual-
i,y ln cenrives Program (EQIP) and ,he Wi ldl ife Habita, 
Incentives Program (WHIP) rargel specific issues. The mOli-
vations fo r BEM offer insights inco porential changes in the 
programs to bu ild more private environmental management. 
Farming for Flexibility 
G iving producers flexibil iry allows them to captu re the 
productivi ty and marketing benefits that stem from BEM. A 
menu of incentives including, bur nOt limited to, fu ll COSt 
reimbursement (green payments), COSt sharing, tax allowances, 
deposit/refund schemes, conserva tion casements, and trad-
able development or pollming rights offers such fl exibili ty. 
Ifflcxible means are available, producers arc free to choose the 
mix of incent ives that maximizes their net benefits while also 
conrributing to publ ic environmental objectives. 
Programs that allow last minute adjustments because of 
limited knowledge of the future effects of present economic 
and environmental decisions and actions will improve over-
all cos t-effectiveness. Producers will also benefit from the fl ex-
ibili ty to design, test, and implement - with possible assis-
tance from public agencies, third-party non-profit groups, or 
certified private consultants - new green technologies and 
marketing strategies appropriate to local physical and eco-
nomic conditions. 
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Institutional Innovations 
Improved coordi nation in rhe delivery and adm inistrative 
systems of the multi-layered federal, state, and local resou rce 
conservation programs decreases producers' transaction (search 
and negotiation) and administ rative COS ts. One possibility is 
private contract ing to bundle together several programs aimed 
at rescoring or conserving environmental amenities. A contract 
of this type migh t be termed a Resource Stewardship Agree-
ment (RSA). 
T he private sector can assist with 
RSA des ign, administration , and 
moni toring. Several states presently 
usc staff funded by non-profit 
groups to implement conservation 
programs. In O regon, rhe O regon 
Wedands Joint Venture Initiative 
fu nds a posit ion within the State 
Natural Resource Conservation Ser-
vice to process WRP appl ications. 
Si milarly, crop co nsuJcants could 
represent several producers inter-
ested in designing agreements for 
an area or a watershed protection plan. 
T he traditional delivery public agency roles are needed if 
unilateral and bi lateral BEM iniriatives are (0 grow. Techni-
ca l advice and fund ing for production systems and monjror-
ing remain essential, and public agency capacity in ed ucation 
and training should extend to integrated production - envi-
ronmental systems that reduce waste and afford green marketing 
opportuni t ies. Reducing producer uncenainty concerning 
potential regularory penalties in the ea rl y stages of BEM will 
foster cost-effective private investments. Public agencies ca.n 
use various options for providing regu la tory cerrain ry in rerurn 
for managing environmental goa.ls and implementi ng envi-
ronmental quality standards. 
Ahernative market institutions [hat help producers cap-
ture the full socia.l benefirs of thei.r environmen tal management 
investments require investigation as wel l. One of the most 
cru.cial attributes of institution build ing is providing pro-
ducers and consumers with ti mely and credib le information 
about opportunities to sell environmental services such as 
wildlife hunring and viewi ng. Government agencies can assist 
in the development of sucb ma.rket institutions. 
Technology Research and Development 
Agro-environmental services often suffer miss ing marker 
incentives for twO differenr reasons. Some bene.fits exrend geo-
graphically beyond the farm boundary, as with reductions in 
sediment and nutrients. O ther benefits, such as the preserva-
rion of biodiversiry, fa ll mosdy [0 furure generations. Public 
inves tmem in developing production systems that reduce envi-
ronmenral wastes and public ri sk is essential to capture long 
term social benefirs. The new R&D orientation requires increased 
public funding and an ongoing effort co enhance adoption of 
BEM in agricul ru re, and to respo nd to demands for agro-envi-
ronmemal services. 
An Organization's Got to Know Its Limitations 
Public programs will continue to play important environ -
mental managemenr roles, but one can make (he case rhat the 
Boggess, W., G. Johns, and C. Meline. "Economic Impacrs of 
Water Quality Programs in the Lake Okeechobee Watershed of 
Florida." Batie,S, D. Ervin, and M. Schulz, Eds. Business-Id 
Initiatives in EnvironmentaL Management: The Next Gen~rtltion 
oJPolicy? Department of Agricultural Economics Special 
Report 92, Mich igan State Univers ity, 1998, pp. 165-86. 
Casey, E. A. Schmitz, S. Swi nton, and D. Zilberman, eds. 
Flexible incentives for tbe Adoption of Environmental 
Technologies in Agriculture. Norwell: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1999. 
leading edge of agro-environmentai man-
agemenc is shifting ro [he privare secror. 
Bot h private for-profit and non-profic 
organizations are currently engaged in these 
activities. However, assuming thar privarc 
acrio n will mitigate all ag ro-environmen-
ral problems is ask ing roo much . Torally 
privare srrategies and ventures will likely 
encounter fai lure , frusrrate public envi-
ronmenral demands, and jeopard ize rhe 
full porcnrial of BEM until researchers can 
A shift toward Reinhardt . F. Down to Earth: Applying 
Business Principles £0 Enviromnemal 
Management. Boston: Harvard Business 
School Press, 2000. 
business 
environmental 
management means 
that farmers and 
Segerson, K. and N. Li. "Voluntary 
approaches ro environmenral proreccion." 
The international Yearbook of 
Environmental and &souru Economics. 
agribusinesses will 
have greater access J 999/2000. H . Folder and T. Teitenberg, 
Eds. C hel tenham: Edward Elgar, [999 better determ ine: to rewards for 
Consumer demand and willingness co 
pay for environmental arrrib tl(es associ-
:ued wirh food and fiber products and their 
production processes; 
producing Social In vestment Porum . 1999 Trends 
R~port. (\\NI\\I. sociaJinves r.org). environmental 
Investment costs and long- run returns 
to incegrared production systems rhar 
goods. Z inn, J. Conservation Spending in Agri-
culture: Trends and Implications. CRS 
Repon for Co ngress. Congress ional Research Service. The 
Library of Congress, October 6, 1999. 
reduce waStes and conserve environmcncai services; 
BEM transaction and administrative cos ts for addressing 
complex problems, slich as the prmccrion ofbiodiversiry on pub-
lic and privare lands; and 
Potential roles of NGOs, fo r eco- Iabeling, certifica tion, 
monitoring, and other services. 
A shift toward BEM means that farmers and agribusinesses 
wi ll have grearer access (Q rewards fo r producing envi ronmental 
goods. Private incentives can develop and spread cnviro n ~ 
mentally and economicaJly susrainable production and marketing 
sys tem innovations. However, public ro les remai n essential, 
especially in setring clear performance targers, reducing regu-
latOry risks during trans ition, delivering management educa-
rion , and developing science~based in nova tions for [he next 
generation of food and fiber systems. 
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